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Problem area 
Runway incursion is broadly 
recognised as an important safety 
issue. Runway incursion alert 
systems in air traffic control towers 
and cockpits are intended to reduce 
runway incursion risk. It is, 
however, not well known how 
effective these alert systems can be. 
Analysis of their effectiveness is 
challenging, because of the context-
dependent distributed and dynamic 
interactions of multiple human 
operators and technical systems in a 
runway incursion scenario. Recent 
views in the safety literature 
indicate that for risk assessment of 
such complex scenarios, we need 
systemic accident modelling, which 
considers accidents as emergent 
phenomena from the performance 
variability of a system.  
 
Description of work 
This paper uses multi-agent 
situation awareness as a prime 
concept for systemic accident 
modelling of a runway incursion 
scenario. In the multi-agent 
situation awareness model a single 
representation is used for both 
situation awareness of humans and 
technical systems. The modelled 
situation awareness is a dynamic 
entity, including information 
attitudes (belief) and pro-attitudes 
(intent). Stochastic effects in 
situation awareness updating 
processes and the dynamic 
interactions between agents are 
contributors to the performance 
variability in the systemic accident 
model. 
 
Results and conclusions 
Accident risk results are provided 
for the effectiveness of alert 
systems in the tower and cockpit in 
good and reduced visibility 
conditions, and for two cases of 
pilot situation awareness errors. The 
results of the Monte Carlo 
simulations indicate that runway 
incursion alert systems may lead to 
a large reduction in conditional 
collision risk during reduced 
visibility conditions. Here, ATC 
runway incursion alerts enable a 
risk reduction of about one order of 
magnitude and cockpit alerts enable 
a risk reduction of about two orders 
of magnitude. In good visibility 
conditions, the effectiveness of 
runway incursion alert systems in 
reducing the conditional collision 
risk values is considerably less. 
Nevertheless, a significant risk 
reduction can still be attained by 
cockpit alert systems for situations 
in which the crew of the taxiing 
aircraft is lost. 
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Summary 
Runway incursion alert systems in air traffic control towers and cockpits are intended to reduce 
runway incursion risk. Analysis of the effectiveness of such systems is challenging, because of 
the context-dependent distributed and dynamic interactions of multiple human operators and 
technical systems in a runway incursion scenario. Recent views in the safety literature indicate 
that for risk assessment of such complex scenarios, we need systemic accident modelling, which 
considers accidents as emergent phenomena from the performance variability of a system. This 
paper uses multi-agent situation awareness as a prime concept for systemic accident modelling 
of a runway incursion scenario. Accident risk results are provided for the effectiveness of alert 
systems in the tower and cockpit for various contextual conditions. 
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Abbreviations 
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1 Introduction 
Runway incursion is broadly recognised as an important safety issue and several guidelines and 
safety programmes have been put forward in an effort to reduce this risk [1], [2], [3]. In addition 
to procedure and training related measures, research and development is done on new 
technology in the aircraft, air traffic control (ATC) tower, ground vehicles and aerodrome. Part 
of these systems aim to reduce the probability of runway incursion by enhancing situation 
awareness, providing improved guidance on the aerodrome and supporting efficient 
communication. Other systems aim to reduce the consequences of a runway incursion by 
alerting one or more involved operators.  
 This latter class most notably includes runway incursion alert systems. Alert systems 
directed to the controller are commercially available and alert systems directed to the pilots are 
the subject of research and development (e.g. NASA Runway Incursion Prevention System [4]). 
Despite the availability of such commercial and experimental systems, their effectiveness in 
reducing accident risk and the conditions under which these systems can be effective are not 
well known in the ATM safety literature. 
 Assessment of runway incursion risk and of the effectiveness of related alert systems is 
complex, due to the large number of human operators, aircraft and supporting technical systems 
on the aerodrome, the large number of interactions between those agents, the dynamics of the 
agents and the range of potential performance deviations of these agents. Therefore, we need 
risk assessment approaches which can address this complexity of aerodrome operations.  
 Recently, there has been a considerable impetus in safety science by approaches for risk 
assessment by systemic accident models [5], [6], [7]. Systemic accident models describe the 
performance of a system as a whole, rather than on the level of events that may go wrong and 
related cause-effect mechanisms, such as in e.g. fault and event trees. The systemic approach 
considers accidents as emergent phenomena from the variability in the performance of 
interacting entities in an organization. As part of continuing research on risk evaluation of 
complex multi-agent organizations, we presented earlier a multi-agent situation awareness 
modelling approach and showed how this can be effectively used for risk assessment of a 
runway incursion scenario involving ATC runway incursion alerting [8], [9]. In [10] we showed 
that this risk assessment approach is a systemic accident model.  
 The accident risk results presented in [8] were achieved for a runway incursion scenario 
in good visibility and involving an ATC runway incursion alert system. Those results showed 
that the effectiveness of ATC runway incursion alerts for lowering the accident risk is very 
small. In subsequent work [10], we showed that the effectiveness of ATC alerts in reduced 
visibility can be considerable. The development of runway incursion alerts in the cockpit is 
motivated by the expectation that these alerts will be more effective than ATC alerts, since they 
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by-pass the alert response and instruction time of the controller. In this paper we evaluate this 
expectation by expanding the model with cockpit alerts and presenting the accident risk results 
that follow from Monte Carlo simulation. 
 The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the aerodrome 
operation for which we assess runway incursion risk aspects. Section 3 introduces accident 
modelling paradigms and argues what type of model is needed for risk assessment of complex 
operations. Section 4 proposes the concept of multi-agent situation awareness as key element in 
systemic accident modelling. Section 5 describes how this concept is effectively applied in an 
accident model of the runway incursion scenario. Section 6 provides results of Monte Carlo 
simulation for the accident model, which show the effectiveness of ATC tower and cockpit 
runway incursion alert systems. Section 7 discusses the methods and results for risk assessment 
of aerodrome operations. 
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2 Runway incursion scenario 
2.1 Aerodrome layout 
We consider a departure runway with a complex surrounding taxiway structure, including a 
taxiway crossing the runway at a distance of 1000 m from the runway threshold. The runway 
crossing may be used for taxiing between the aprons and a second runway, according to a 
runway crossing procedure that will be outlined later. The runway crossing has stopbars at 153 
m from the runway centreline, which are remotely controlled by the runway controller.  
 
2.2 Weather conditions 
The operation is considered under limited weather conditions, in particular without wind and for 
the following two visibility conditions. 
• Visibility condition 1: unrestricted visibility range; implying that pilots as well as controllers 
can visually observe the traffic situation. This is in line with visibility condition 1 of 
ICAO’s A-SMGCS manual [11]. 
• Visibility condition 2: visibility range between 400 m and 1500 m; implying that controllers 
cannot visually observe the traffic and pilots are not always able to see the conflicting 
aircraft during the initial part of the take-off run. The lower limit of this visibility range (400 
m) is equal to the upper limit of the runway visible range of visibility condition 3 indicated 
in [11]; the upper limit (1500 m) is chosen for this study (no value is given in [11]). 
 
2.3 Human operators 
The main human operators involved in the runway crossing operation are the pilots of the 
taking-off aircraft, the pilots of the taxiing aircraft, the runway controller and the ground 
controllers responsible for traffic on nearby taxiways. The pilots are responsible for safe 
conduct of the flight operations and should actively monitor for potential conflicting traffic 
situations. The runway controller is responsible for safe and efficient traffic handling on the 
runway and the runway crossings. The ground controllers are responsible for safe and efficient 
traffic handling on taxiways in the surrounding of the runway.   
 
2.4 Crossing procedure 
Aircraft may taxi across the active runway via the following procedure. The control over the 
taxiing aircraft is transferred from the responsible ground controller to the runway controller 
(including a change of the R/T frequency). Taking into consideration the traffic situation, the 
runway controller specifies a crossing clearance to the taxiing aircraft and switches off the 
remotely controlled stopbar. The crew of the taxiing aircraft acknowledges the clearance and 
initiates taxiing across the runway. The crew reports when the taxiing aircraft has vacated the 
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runway, upon which the control over the aircraft is transferred from the runway controller to the 
responsible ground controller.  
 
2.5 ATC alerts 
The runway controller has the disposition of alerts that intend to reduce the risk of runway 
incursion. These alerts are based on ground radar tracking data and consist of audible warnings 
and an indication on the ground surveillance display. A runway incursion alert is presented 
when an aircraft is crossing the runway in front of an aircraft that has initiated to take-off. A 
stopbar violation alert is presented when an aircraft crosses an active stopbar in the direction of 
the runway. 
 
2.6 Cockpit alerts 
Both the crews of the taking off and the taxiing aircraft have the disposition of cockpit runway 
incursion alerts. The cockpit runway incursion alert systems use satellite-based position 
estimation systems in each aircraft, and data-link communication of this navigation data 
between the aircraft. The cockpit alerts are thus independent from the ATC alerts. The cockpit 
runway incursion alert systems provide an aural alert if a runway incursion conflict is detected. 
These systems use a generic approach for runway incursion zone monitoring, which leads to an 
alert when a taxiing aircraft is within a specified distance from the runway and the other aircraft 
has initiated the take-off [4]. 
 
2.7 Communication/Navigation/Surveillance  
Communication between controllers and crews is via VHF R/T communication systems. The 
pilots use their knowledge on the aerodrome layout and maps for taxiing. Ground radar tracking 
data of all aircraft and sufficiently large vehicles on the airport surface is shown on HMI’s of 
the tower controllers. Both the runway controller and the pilots have alert systems, as described 
above.  
 
2.8 Runway incursion case 
We consider a runway incursion case in which an aircraft is taxiing across the active departure 
runway over the taxiway at 1000 m from the runway threshold, while it should not. This is due 
to the situation awareness of the crew of the taxiing aircraft, which is either that crossing of the 
runway is allowed, or the pilots think to be taxiing on a regular taxiway that does not cross the 
runway (i.e. they are lost). An overview of the main agents and their interactions in the runway 
incursion scenario is shown in Figure 1. The pilot not flying is not considered as agent in the 
current model of the runway incursion scenario; this is discussed in Section 7. 
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Figure 1: Main interactions between agents in the runway incursion scenario. 
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3 Accident modelling paradigms 
3.1 Sequential / Epidemiological models 
Safety risk assessment and management in the air traffic industry as well as in other industries 
have to a large extent been based on two paradigms for accident causation, namely (1) 
sequential accident models and (2) epidemiological accident models [5]. Sequential accident 
models describe an accident as the result of a sequence of events that occur in a specific order; 
examples are the domino theory, event trees, fault trees and networks models. Epidemiological 
accident models describe an accident in analogy with the spreading of a disease, i.e. as the 
outcome of a combination of factors, such as performance deviations, environmental conditions, 
barriers and latent conditions. Examples of epidemiological models are the “Swiss cheese” 
model [12] and Bayesian belief networks [13]. Both sequential and epidemiological accident 
models rely on cause-effect propagation in accidents and give a fixed representation of relations 
between failures, errors and contextual conditions. Predominantly, they represent relations 
between probabilities of event occurrences that are cause-effect implied. They do not address 
emergent behaviour due to interactions between entities.  
 For safety assessment of air traffic, these two types of accident models are used 
extensively. Sequential accident models are commonly known and applied in aviation. Fault and 
event trees are often applied in system dependability and safety requirement studies for air 
traffic [14], [15]. Epidemiological accident models have recently been used in air traffic safety 
assessment methods such as the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System [16] and 
Bayesian belief networks for air transport safety [13], [17]. 
 Recent views on accident causation indicate that the sequential and epidemiological 
accident models may not be adequate to represent the complexity of modern socio-technical 
systems [5], [6], [7], [18]. Key determinants of this complexity include the number and variety 
of organizational entities (human, groups, technical systems), the number and types of 
interdependencies between organizational entities, the degree of distribution of the entities 
(single/multiple locations), the types of dynamic performance of the entities (static/slow/fast), 
and the number and types of hazards in the organization. Figure 1 well illustrates the complexity 
of the interactions between agents in the runway incursion scenario. Limitations of sequential 
and epidemiological accident models include the difficultness to represent the large number of 
interdependencies between organizational entities and the dynamics of these interdependencies. 
Since the focus on failures in sequential and epidemiological accident models is there also used 
for the evaluation of human performance, the roles of humans are practically restricted to 
making errors and resolving safety-critical situations. 
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3.2 Systemic accident models 
Quite a different approach is followed in a third type of accident model [5]: systemic accident 
modelling. The systemic accident model view considers accidents as emergent phenomena from 
the performance variability of a system. Here the term ‘system’ is used in a broad sense as an 
organization of interacting humans and technical systems, i.e. a joint cognitive system [19]. The 
performance of a joint cognitive system is variable due to external noisy influences and the 
interactions between its entities. In particular, Hollnagel [5] argues that in daily practice, 
humans do not always work strictly according to rules and procedures, but adapt their 
performance according to the perceived requirements set by the working context. In other 
words, human performance must be variable to handle efficiently the complex interactions in a 
socio-technical environment. Hollnagel also argues that the combined and coupled performance 
variability in an organization may lead to functional resonance, i.e. enlarged deviations in 
performance from normal practice, which may be a source of accident causation. In a systemic 
framework, accident prevention is based on finding dependencies in a socio-technical 
organization that may lead to functional resonance, and monitoring and controlling such critical 
dependencies. As a basis for the analysis and understanding of complex systems, Pariès [20] 
points out that we should relate its micro and macro levels its micro and macro levels, such that 
macro level properties emerge from assembling micro level properties. This view is in line with 
multi-agent modelling, which considers the local perspective and behaviour of agents, and the 
emergence of overall behaviour due to the distributed agent interactions [21], [22]. Above views 
indicate that for risk assessment of complex organizations (such as air traffic) we need 
approaches that account for the variability in their multi-agent performance and the emergence 
of safety occurrences from this variability.  
 Systemic accident models have their origins in cybernetic control theory and chaos 
theory. Recent developments in systemic accident modelling include Functional Resonance 
Accident Model (FRAM), Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) and 
Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer (TOPAZ). FRAM uses a functional 
representation of an operation and describes performance variability based on a number of 
characteristics of each function (input, output, resources, time, control and preconditions) and 
the interactions with other functions [5]. A qualitative analysis is used to evaluate safety-critical 
conditions where the interdependencies in a FRAM network may give rise to functional 
resonance. STAMP is based on system and control theory, and uses the key principle that 
accidents may occur as the result of a lack of control constraints imposed on the system design 
and on operations [7]. STAMP applications have mostly focussed on interactions at higher 
organizational levels than the human-system level. STAMP supports quantitative evaluation of 
risk levels as function of organizational processes, but not at the level of accident probability. 
The TOPAZ methodology is based on stochastic system and control theory, and employs the 
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basic principle that accidents may result from stochastic and dynamic interactions between 
agents in a traffic scenario. It uses integration with a qualitative safety risk assessment cycle, 
mathematical modelling, Monte Carlo simulation and uncertainty evaluations to analyse the 
safety of air traffic operations up to the level of accident probability [23], [24], [25], [26]. Multi-
agent situation awareness is a key concept in TOPAZ [8], [9]. The following sections discuss 
this concept and its integration in a systemic accident model.   
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4 Multi-agent situation awareness 
4.1 Human cognition 
From human factors studies it is well known that lack of proper situation awareness is an 
important contributor to the occurrence of incidents and accidents [27], [28]. Situation 
awareness has been defined in the literature as a state or as a process [29]. The best known and 
most influential definition is the state-oriented one of Endsley [27]: Situation awareness is the 
perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. In this 
definition, situation awareness is a dynamic state of knowledge which discerns three levels: 
1. perception of elements in the environment, 
2. comprehension of the current situation, 
3. projection of the future status. 
 The process of achieving, acquiring and maintaining situation awareness is referred to 
as situation assessment [27]. Situation assessment processes depend on a range of human 
performance characteristics [30] and may lead to incomplete or inaccurate situation awareness 
at the three indicated levels. At level 1, a person may wrongly or not perceive task-relevant 
information, depending on aspects as signal characteristics, perception strategies and 
expectations. At level 2, a person may wrongly interpret perceived information, for instance due 
to miss-use or non-existence of proper mental models of the environment. At level 3, a person 
may wrongly predict a future status, for instance due to a lack of good mental model or memory 
limitations. 
For a group of interacting humans the concept of team situation awareness is used [27]. In 
addition to the cognitive processes as perception, comprehension and projection, acquiring team 
situation awareness depends on team processes such as communication and coordination. Team 
situation awareness may be seen as individual situation awareness plus a number of processes to 
share part of the individual situation awareness with team members. In teams, the situation 
awareness of individual members may be affected as result of imperfect communication and 
coordination processes, or due to information transfer processes based on inappropriate situation 
awareness. 
 
4.2 Distributed artificial intelligence 
In the field of distributed artificial intelligence, human mentalistic notions similar to that of 
situation awareness are used. Ascription of mental qualities to technical systems is recognised 
as useful for analysis of complex systems, even if a complete and accurate description of the 
system is available. The human mentalistic notions are then abstractions, which provide a 
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convenient and familiar way of describing, explaining and predicting behaviour of complex 
systems [21]. The two most important types of attitudes are  
• information attitudes: belief, knowledge; and 
• pro-attitudes: desire, intention, obligation, commitment, choice, etc. 
In distributed artificial intelligence, an agent is known as a computational mechanism with these 
attitudes that exhibits a high degree of autonomy, performing actions in its environment based 
on information (sensors, feedback) received from the environment. A multi-agent environment 
is defined broadly as a situation with more than one agent, where agents interact with one 
another, and there are constraints such that agents may not know everything about the world 
that other agents know [22].  
 
4.3 Socio-technical organizations  
For risk assessment of socio-technical organizations, the performance of human operators, 
technical systems and their interactions must be accounted for. In this context of socio-technical 
organizations, we use the term agent from the field of distributed artificial intelligence in a 
broad sense to represent technical systems as well as human operators. Furthermore, we broaden 
the term situation awareness from the field of human factors to represent the state of human 
operators as well as technical systems. We coin the term multi-agent situation awareness to 
stress the union of both disciplines in representation of information attitudes and pro-attitudes in 
an environment of interacting human operators and technical systems [8], [9].  
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5 Multi-agent SA accident model 
5.1 Multi-agent SA component and dynamics 
The main agents and interactions in the model of the runway incursion alerts case are 
shown in Figure 1. These agents include both the aircraft taking-off and taxiing, the aircrafts’ 
pilots flying, the aircrafts’ flight management systems (including GPS receiver, ADS-B system, 
incursion alert system), the runway controller and the ATC system (including surveillance 
systems, communication systems, airport manoeuvre control systems, airport configuration, 
environmental conditions). 
In a multi-agent environment such as in Figure 1, a single agent may have situation 
awareness about each agent, i.e. in an environment of n agents the situation awareness of agent 
k at time t is  
1
, , , ,, , , ,
j n
t k t k t k t kσ σ σ σ⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦K K   
Agents are not omniscient; situation awareness components may be unknown. The situation 
awareness ,σ jt k includes information attitudes, such as beliefs concerning identify, state and 
mode of an agent; this part is named ‘state situation awareness’. Additionally, the situation 
awareness ,σ jt k includes a pro-attitude [21] regarding the intent of agent j; this part is named 
‘intent situation awareness’. The intent situation awareness includes anticipated modes, states 
and related times. Details on the mathematical representation of situation awareness can be 
found in [8], [9]. Table 1 shows examples of situation awareness components of the agents 
considered in the runway incursion example. 
As is stipulated by the time index t, the situation awareness is a dynamic state. A general 
update process for the situation awareness is:  
SA update
' '( , )τσ σ ε+ =t tf  
where 't  is a trigger time of the updating process, τ  is the duration of the updating process and 
ε  denotes stochastic effects that influence the updating process. In [8], [9] we distinguished 
three types of updating processes, depending on the information transfer between the involved 
agents: 
• Reasoning: process in which the SA of an agent is updated without any interaction with 
other agents; 
• Observation: process in which the SA of an agent is updated via a unidirectional 
information flow from another agent; 
• Communication: process in which the SA of an agent is updated via a bidirectional 
information flow with another agent, which may also lead to a change in the SA of the other 
agent. 
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Examples of specific situation awareness updating processes for the runway incursion accident 
model are shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Examples of situation awareness aspects and situation awareness updating processes 
for the runway incursion scenario (see also Figure 1). 
Agent Situation awareness aspects Situation awareness 
updating processes 
PF taking-off aircraft • Identity, mode, position, velocity of 
own and other aircraft 
• ATC clearance 
• Mode of cockpit alert 
• Next waypoint 
• Visual observation 
• Auditory monitoring 
• Speech communication  
• Conflict recognition & 
reaction 
PF taxiing aircraft • Identity, mode, position, velocity of 
own and other aircraft 
• ATC clearance 
• Mode of controlled stopbar 
• Mode of cockpit alert 
• Next waypoint 
• Visual observation 
• Auditory monitoring 
• Speech communication 
• Conflict recognition & 
reaction 
Runway controller • Identity, mode, position, velocity of 
aircraft 
• Mode of controlled stopbar 
• Modes of ATC alerts 
• Next waypoints of aircraft 
• Visual observation 
• Auditory monitoring 
• Speech communication 
• Conflict recognition & 
reaction 
FMS taking-off 
aircraft 
• Identity, mode, position, velocity of 
own and other aircraft 
• Aerodrome geometry data 
• Mode of cockpit alert 
• Satellite position 
estimation 
• Data-link communication 
• Alert setting process 
FMS taxiing aircraft • Identity, mode, position, velocity of 
own and other aircraft 
• Aerodrome geometry data 
• Mode of cockpit alert 
• Satellite position 
estimation 
• Data-link communication 
• Alert setting process 
ATC system • Position, velocity of aircraft • Aerodrome geometry data 
• Modes of ATC alerts 
• Ground radar tracking 
• Alert setting process 
Taking-off aircraft  • Position, velocity of own aircraft • Aircraft dynamics 
Taxiing aircraft • Position, velocity of own aircraft • Aircraft dynamics 
 
5.2 Multi-agent systemic accident modelling 
The systemic accident model view considers accidents as emergent phenomena from the 
variability of a (joint cognitive) system. In the context of a multi-agent organization this 
variability is due to the variability in SA updating processes. The variability of SA updating 
processes is described in various modes of the agents, which represent situations in which there 
may be considerable differences between the SA updating processes. Table 2 describes selected 
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modes of the runway incursion alerts case. For ease of discussion, we distinguish nominal and 
non-nominal modes.  
 In nominal modes, the SA updating processes are frequently occurring processes with 
variations within a normal range. Examples of these variations consider (see also Table 1 and 
Table 2) the usual accuracy of visual observation by a controller, the typical visual monitoring 
frequency of pilot, or the normal accuracy of a surveillance system. Although these variations 
are considered normal, in combination with the variations in related multi-agent interactions 
they may lead to safety-critical situations, i.e. provide considerable contributions to the overall 
risk level.  
 Non-nominal modes describe more seldom situations and related SA updating 
processes. Table 2 provides a range of examples for the runway incursion alerts case. Such non-
nominal situations often reflect degradation or non-functioning of a technical system, or an 
erroneous interpretation of reality by a human operator. These types of events are similar to 
failures and errors such as typically considered in sequential and epidemiological accident 
models. However, in the current systemic accident model these events are not directly 
associated with risk levels, but they indicate how related situation awareness updating processes 
are affected. These afflictions of the situation awareness updating processes may then induce a 
risk increase. Thus, the risk levels emerge from the variability of the agents’ performance and 
interactions in the accident model.  
 
Table 2: Examples of mode-dependent SA updating processes.  
Component Mode Impact on SA updating processes 
Agent: Flight Management System Taxiing / Taking-off Aircraft 
Nominal Information is received with a normal sampling rate  
Interrupt Information is received after a prolonged time 
ADS-B Receiver 
Down ADS-B receiver does not function 
Up Information is transmitted with a normal sampling rate ADS-B Transmitter 
Down ADS-B transmitter does not function 
Nominal Information is received with a normal sampling rate 
and accuracy 
Interrupt Information is received after a prolonged time 
GPS Receiver 
Down GPS receiver does not function at all 
Correct Airport map database is correct for the specific airport Airport Map 
Database Incorrect Airport map database is erroneous for the specific 
airport, leading to lack of runway incursion alerting 
Runway Incursion 
Alert Avionics 
Up Runway incursion alert avionics system is working 
nominally 
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Availability Down Runway incursion alert avionics system is not 
working, leading to lack of runway incursion alerting 
Agent: Pilot Flying Taxiing Aircraft 
Intent SA = 
Proceed 
Taxiway 
Pilot believes to be taxiing on a normal taxiway, while 
actually proceeding toward a runway crossing; leading 
to sub-optimal visual monitoring 
State Situation 
Awareness PF 
Intent SA = 
Cross Runway 
Pilot believes that crossing of the runway is allowed, 
while actually it is not allowed  
Agent: ATC System 
Up ATC surveillance data is provided at normal rates and 
accuracy  
Surveillance 
Tracking  
Down ATC surveillance data is not provided 
Up ATC runway incursion alerts are provided according 
to normal settings  
ATC Runway 
Incursion Alert 
System Down ATC runway incursion alerts are not provided 
Up Tower-cockpit communication is supported normally  
Delaying Tower-cockpit communication is delayed  
R/T Communication 
Systems 
Down No tower-cockpit communication 
 
As a basis for the Monte Carlo simulations of the air traffic scenario, the qualitative descriptions 
of the situation awareness updating processes in Table 1 and Table 2 are further detailed in 
mathematical models, which uniquely define the stochastic dynamics of the related agents 
(human operators and technical systems). These models are specified by a compositional 
specification approach using a stochastic dynamic extension of the Petri net formalism [31]. 
Within this Petri net formalism a hierarchically structured representation of the agents in the air 
traffic scenario is developed, including key aspects of agents, modes within these key aspects, 
dynamics within these modes and interactions between these model elements (see [10]for 
examples). The choice of parameter values for the simulation model is typically based on a 
variety of sources, such as technical system specifications, scientific expertise and literature on 
safety and human factors, searches in incident databases, interviews with operational experts, 
measurement data from real operations, measurement data from real-time simulations, and 
simulation results from other relevant models. In practice, limited data on appropriate parameter 
values is available for the contextual conditions considered, leading to a probability density 
function / confidence interval of possible parameter values. Typically, the mean of this interval 
is chosen for the simulation model and an analysis of the effect of the uncertainty in the 
parameter value on the risk is included in a bias and uncertainty assessment [26]. If the 
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uncertainty in the parameter value has a significant effect on the risk, an additional effort may 
be done to attain a better estimate. 
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6 Monte Carlo simulation  
In this section we provide the results of Monte Carlo simulations with the model developed. The 
collision risks are simulated conditional on the visibility condition and the situation awareness 
of the pilot flying of the taxiing aircraft, which represents the intention to either continue taxiing 
on the current regular taxiway or to cross the runway. The conditional collision risks achieved 
in the Monte Carlo simulations for the multi-agent dynamic risk model are shown in Figure 2 
and Figure 3 for visibility conditions 1 and 2, respectively. For both visibility conditions and 
intent situation awareness cases, the conditional collision risks are shown for the situation 
without alert systems (‘None’), with an ATC alert system only (‘ATC’), with cockpit alert 
systems only (‘A/C’), and with both ATC and cockpit alert systems (‘ATC+A/C’).  
 The Monte Carlo simulation results in Figure 2 show that for an unrestricted visibility 
range (visibility condition 1) the conditional collision risk strongly depends on the situation 
awareness of the pilot flying of the taxiing aircraft. This difference is mainly caused by the 
improved (more frequent) monitoring strategy in the model for the case that the pilot intends to 
cross the runway compared to the case that the pilot intends to proceed on a regular taxiway. 
The Monte Carlo simulation results show that the effectiveness of the ATC alerts in visibility 
condition 1 is very small. In this situation the conflict has almost always been recognised by the 
pilots of one or both aircraft before the controller has the chance to react to the alert and instruct 
the pilots, and in the remaining cases the controller can usually not timely warn the pilots. The 
results indicate that in visibility condition 1, the effectiveness of the cockpit alerts is higher than 
ATC alerts for the situation where the pilots of the taxiing aircraft are not aware to be taxiing 
towards the runway. Here a quick cockpit alert may timely warn the crew of the taxiing aircraft. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of ATC alerts in addition to cockpit alerts seems limited. 
 For a visibility range between 400 and 1500 m (visibility condition 2), the Monte Carlo 
simulation-based risks are quite different. Firstly, it follows from comparison of Figure 2 and 
Figure 3, that the conditional collision risks are considerably higher in the reduced visibility 
condition. Secondly, it can be observed in Figure 3 that similar conditional collision risks are 
obtained for both the cases of situation awareness of the pilot flying of the taxiing aircraft. In 
this visibility condition, the improved monitoring strategy of the pilot does not support early-
stage recognition of the conflict. Thirdly, the ATC alerts enable a significant reduction in the 
conditional collision risk. Here, the conflict can often not be recognised by the pilots at an early 
stage and the alerts reduce the conflict detection time for the controller. Fourthly, the cockpit 
alerts result in a major reduction of the conditional collision risk. In this case, the conflict 
recognition time is further reduced by direct notification of the pilots. Fifthly, the alerts are 
more effective in the case where the pilot is intending to cross. This is due to the model aspect 
that in this case the aircraft may initiate taxiing from stance, thereby increasing the time before 
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it reaches the collision critical zone on the runway. Sixthly, the effectiveness of the ATC alerts 
in addition to the cockpit alerts is limited. 
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Figure 2: Estimated conditional collision risks in good visibility. 
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
SA PF:              Proceed taxiway                    Cross runway
C
on
di
tio
na
l c
ol
lis
io
n 
ris
k 
(p
er
 ta
ke
-o
ff)
Alerts:         None  ATC  A/C ATC+A/C   None  ATC  A/C ATC+A/C
 
Figure 3: Estimated conditional collision risks in reduced visibility (400-1500 m). 
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7 Discussion 
In this paper multi-agent situation awareness is used as a key concept for systemic accident 
modelling of complex socio-technical organizations. Important aspects of this method are 
illustrated by a safety evaluation of the effectiveness of tower and cockpit alerts in a runway 
incursion scenario.  
 In the multi-agent situation awareness model a single representation is used for both 
situation awareness of humans and technical systems. The modelled situation awareness is a 
dynamic variable, which considers information attitudes (belief) and pro-attitudes (intent), and 
is being changed by updating functions. Stochastic effects in these updating processes (e.g. 
perceptual noise, decision variance, duration until update) and the dynamic interactions between 
the agents are contributors to the performance variability in this systemic accident model.  
 The common notion of situation awareness for both humans and technical systems 
makes it a very suitable model for analysis of a joint cognitive system. A safety assessment 
ideally should address the performance of a joint cognitive system including all relevant humans 
and technical systems, rather than the performance of a (new) technical system and its direct 
interactions with humans / other systems. The suitability of the multi-agent situation awareness 
model is illustrated by the runway incursion alerts case. Here, the performance of a wide range 
of human operators and technical systems is considered, such as pilots, runway controller, tower 
and cockpit alert systems, communication systems, surveillance systems, etc. Therefore, we can 
assess the effectiveness of the tower and cockpit alert systems in reducing the accident risk of 
the runway incursion scenario in the context of the performance of the involved human 
operators, i.e. given that an accident would not have been prevented by the involved pilots or 
controller.  
 This kind of analysis of the effectiveness of a single agent (e.g. an alert system) in the 
context of a multi-agent organization with complex interactions is very difficult to achieve by 
sequential or epidemiological accident models. These models are not well suited for the 
dependent dynamics of the agents in this type of traffic scenario. For instance, in order to 
analyse the effectiveness of an ATC alert by these models, we would require data like ‘the 
probability that an alerted controller warns the pilots when the taxiing aircraft is at position X 
and given that the crews of the taxiing aircraft as well as the taking-off aircraft have not yet 
detected the conflict either visually or via a cockpit alert.’ Since these kinds of conditional 
probabilities can usually not be obtained, one typically has to assume that events/entities 
happen/act independently from each other and in a fixed sequence.  
 Systemic accident modelling is being broadly recognised as an important new stream 
for risk assessment [6]. Within the class of systemic accident models there are various ways to 
represent the performance variability of joint cognitive systems, main recent developments 
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include FRAM [5], STAMP [7] and TOPAZ [23]. The multi-agent situation awareness model 
presented in the current paper is part of TOPAZ and differs considerably from the other 
approaches. FRAM uses a functional decomposition of operations (which may include several 
agents in a function) and describes performance variability based on a number of characteristics 
of each function and the interactions with other functions. FRAM does not use mathematical 
modelling, Monte Carlo simulation or risk quantification. STAMP is based on system and 
control theory, where accidents may occur as the result of a lack of control constraints. Use of 
STAMP has focussed on interactions at a higher organizational level rather than the human-
system level addressed in the multi-agent situation awareness model. STAMP does not use 
Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate stochastic variations. STAMP provides quantitative risk 
levels as function of organizational processes, but not at the level of accident probability.      
 The conditional collision risks that follow from the Monte Carlo simulations depend on 
the assumptions adopted in the mathematical model and simulation process. These assumptions 
address, for instance, airport specific aspects (e.g. traffic density, traffic characteristics, runway 
and taxiway geometry), human performance characteristics (e.g. monitoring intervals, alert 
reaction times, conflict detection strategy), performance of runway incursion alert systems (e.g. 
alert threshold distances, conflict detection settings), and exclusion of agents (e.g. exclusion of 
pilots not flying). In a risk assessment for a specific operation at a particular airport, its specific 
characteristics should be accounted for in dedicated Monte Carlo simulations, as well as 
included in a bias and uncertainty assessment of the Monte Carlo simulation-based results. Such 
a bias and uncertainty assessment evaluates the effects of the assumptions on the bias and 
uncertainty in the risk level via a number of steps, including a risk sensitivity analysis [26]. For 
assumptions with a large potential effect on the risk, additional parameter value sources or an 
enhanced model structure may be strived for in a subsequent risk assessment cycle. For 
instance, in a bias and uncertainty assessment of a runway incursion scenario without alerts 
[10], the effect on the risk of the neglect of the pilot not flying of the taxiing aircraft was 
assessed to be more than 30%. On basis of such insight, it may be considered to explicitly 
represent in follow-up research the pilot not flying as agent in the model and team situation 
awareness of the cockpit crew. The results of the current study are derived for a generic runway 
crossing operation on a taxiway at 1000 m from the runway threshold and do not include an 
assessment of uncertainty and potential bias in the results.   
The results of the Monte Carlo simulations indicate that runway incursion alert systems 
may lead to a large reduction in conditional collision risk during reduced visibility conditions. 
Here, ATC runway incursion alerts enable a conditional risk reduction of about one order of 
magnitude and cockpit alerts enable a conditional risk reduction of about two orders of 
magnitude. In good visibility conditions, the effectiveness of runway incursion alert systems in 
reducing the conditional collision risk values is considerably less. Nevertheless, the Monte 
  
NLR-TP-2007-563 
  
 26 
Carlo simulations indicate that a significant reduction in the conditional risk can still be attained 
by cockpit alert systems for situations in which the crew of the taxiing aircraft is lost and aware 
to be taxiing on a normal taxiway rather than a runway crossing. Since the likelihood of good 
visibility is typically much larger than of reduced visibility, cockpit alerts may thus also support 
a considerable risk reduction due to use in good visibility for cases where pilots are lost during 
taxiing.  
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